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Summary 
The Negociatrix Policy Game is a tool for training in multilateral negotiation, which has been 
developed through a partnership between FAO and the University of Wageningen in the Netherlands. 
This tool is a software based on a quantitative model and a simulation that consents to underline the 
importance of analytical capacities in negotiations and to demonstrate the importance of consistency 
of the strategies of negotiation. This software is applied to the multilateral trade negotiations for 
agriculture. It is inspired by the simulation called Negociatrix (www.fao.org/tc/tca/negotiation) that 
FAO developed at an earlier stage (2005) and that has been presented at the Harvard PON/IRENE 
conference in November 2005 in Paris. The software allows simulating several successive rounds of 
negotiation and notably revealing after each round the impact of the agreement concluded to the 
previous round. In that sense, the strategy of negotiation adopted can be more directly evaluated.    
The software is conceived like a tool to support the preparation of decisions and negotiations. This 
article presents the structure of the software, explains how it works, comments the first application 
modalities and proposes the conditions of use. 
Résumé 
Le Negociatrix Policy Game est un outil de formation à la négociation multilatérale développé, en 
partenariat entre la FAO et l'Université de Wageningen aux Pays Bas. Cet outil se présente comme un 
logiciel basé sur un modèle quantitatif et une simulation qui permet de souligner à la fois l'importance 
des capacités d'analyse en négociation et de démontrer l’importance de la cohérence des stratégies de 
négociation. Ce logiciel est appliqué aux négociations commerciales multilatérales sur l'agriculture et 
il s'inspire de la simulation appelée Negociatrix (www.fao.org/tc/tca/negotiation)  que la FAO a 
développé antérieurement (2005) et qui a été présenté lors de la conférence Harvard PON/IRENE de 
novembre 2005 à Paris. Le logiciel permet notamment de simuler plusieurs cycles successifs de 
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négociation en révélant l'impact de l'accord conclu lors du cycle précédent. Ainsi la stratégie de 
négociation adoptée peut être plus directement évaluée.  
Le logiciel est conçu comme un outil pour soutenir la préparation de décision et de négociations. Cet 
article présente la structure du logiciel, explique son fonctionnement, commente les résultats des 
premières applications ainsi que des propositions de modalités et conditions d’utilisation.  
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1 Introduction 
As economics has become more and more technical over time and the complexity, intensity 
and interdependence of (international) economic relations increase, the use of games provides 
an important connection between theories and the key features of the markets and institutions 
that are studied. Since the 1960s economists have experimented with incorporating 
computerized economic simulations into their classes (Porter, Riley and Ruffer, 2004). 
Examples in micro economics classes are optimization exercises (students maximize utility or 
profits given some fixed parameters) and market simulations (with endogenously determined 
prices and exogenous ‘shift’-variables). The games used in macro economics all involve 
students selecting policy variables to try to control inflation, unemployment and other 
variables (economic growth, consumption, balance of trade surplus).  
From a quick scan of the literature it appears that teachers who use these tools are usually 
very positive about it, although there have been only a few controlled studies of the 
effectiveness of the use of games. However, where done these studies emphasized the positive 
contribution of games in the student’s learning process (Gremmen and Potter, 1997). At a 
course given at the University of Amsterdam, for example, the failure rate was reduced by 
50% in the year following the introduction of a required series of laboratory exercises (Holt, 
1999: 609). 
Many instructors are hesitant to use games for fear of losing control or of obtaining 
anomalous results that will be difficult to explain. Others object that games are too much 
time-consuming or difficult to use in large classes. Indeed, the game outcomes might be 
unpredictable, in particular when the underlying models are complex. For the macro 
economic policy analysis games, however, the patterns and evolution of the game will be 
recognizable in particular for the experienced teachers. The need to improvise during the 
lectures when explaining results is therewith strongly reduced. 
An important argument mentioned in favour of using games is that they excellently fit in with 
a Socratic teaching approach. In this approach students are made thinking about the subject 
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they want to learn and encouraged to ask good questions. If the games they play involve 
(small) groups, students start to learn from each other. Moreover, they come with questions 
where they lack knowledge. This enables the teacher-trainer to address these questions or 
issues which bother the students. It is important in the Socratic education philosophy not to go 
too straight to the final answer but to take incorrect answers seriously and to ask follow-up 
questions, or to suggest new experiments which might provide further insight (Holt, 1999: 
610). 
The Negociatrix policy game, which is the focus of this paper, is used as a complementary 
tool to the simulations used in the capacity building workshops on negotiation proposed by 
FAO. It also builds upon the experience acquired with AgriPOL, a computer game used in 
Wageningen University in agricultural and trade policy courses. The so-called Negociatrix 
Policy Game has been jointly developed by FAO and University of Wageningen. The main 
objectives of the Negociatrix Policy Game is to train high level policy makers of the 
developing world by developing both negotiation skills and capacities in analysing trade 
policy impacts. The Negociatrix Policy Game aims at: 
- Improving the knowledge and competence on negotiation 
- Sharing experiences and know how 
- Developing awareness of crucial role of policy analysis  
With this Negociatrix policy game, the Project on Negotiation for Agriculture at FAO 
addresses its second specific objective, which is to demonstrate the usefulness of analytical 
capacities, in addition to negotiation skills, to conduct successful negotiations.  
Moreover, this activity focuses on one major difficulty of any negotiation, namely the need to 
deal with both content and process at the same time.  
The Negociatrix Policy Game emphasizes this major constraint as the participants/trainees are 
invited to develop the analysis component of each negotiation.   
The Negociatrix policy game is presented like a software to build capacities in agricultural 
policy analysis. The model is developed in reference to the context described in the 
Negociatrix simulation. It features the same countries and actors but focuses on the impact 
analysis of each agreement. For each country a policy context and a virtual economy has been 
created. The players run several rounds and the software shows, at a glance and after each 
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round, what kind of welfare effect an agreement would have on certain economic variables 
(government expenditure, consumer surplus, producer surplus, etc.) by modifying, as a result 
of the negotiation, some policy instruments (e.g. halving of tariffs or capping of certain 
supports). The interest lies with the fact that this exercise has to be related to the dynamics of 
preparing, conducting and analysing a negotiation. 
This communication is ordered as follows.  
In the first section the game-specifications are discussed. The second section introduces key 
elements of economics and trade policy that were considered to create, structure and close the 
model.  
The third section discusses the results of the first application of this tool as well as some 
consideration of the possible conditions of use.  
2 Specifications of the Negociatrix-Policy-Game 
The objective of the Policy game for each player or negotiator is to raise the national welfare 
under the constraints that twelve countries are pursuing the same objective. Countries are 
supposed to directly and indirectly negotiate changes on nine policy instruments (see affecting 
three commodities: 
• A cash crop which is called tonco in the simulation and presents most of the cotton 
characteristics.  
• A basic food crop which is called zor in the simulation and is very similar to rice. 
• A processed crop called casuc in the simulation and is a mix of the sugar and coffee 
market specificities. 
Each country is producer or/and consumer of at least two products and sometimes of the 
three. 
The outcome of the game (negotiation) will depend, to a large extent, on the negotiation 
strategy (the cooperation/ competition paradigm) adopted by each player as well as on the 
analysis of the situation of agriculture in his/her country and in other countries.  
As the Negociatrix-Policy-Game has been specifically developed to strengthen analytical 
capacities, it includes more detailed policy instruments than what had been initially the case 
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in the Negociatrix simulation which is however used as a reference in designing the policy 
game. The following set of policy instruments is proposed:  
• import tariff and export subsidy 
• maximum production ceilings (quota) 
• preferential market access via tariff rate import quota 
• (decoupled) direct income payments  
• deficiency payments 
• structural investments 
• intervention mechanism 
• set-aside 
• food aid 
• financial aid 
Since the environment of the model is mostly virtual, information is needed about the data-
base. For each country a profile has been prepared including the following sections: 
• General information (global share of agricultural production, consumption and trade, 
level of production of each commodity, influence on world market and on agriculture 
and food in other countries and other market effects) 
• Agricultural Policy (general objective, main instruments used such as price support, 
direct payments, production quotas, area set-aside or intervention storage, other 
relevant policy affecting the agricultural sector such as structural policy) 
• Welfare function (description of the main component of the welfare function 
according to the society or the national context, issues like farm incomes with respect 
to the national or regional political framework, government expenditure for 
agriculture, the weight of the agricultural trade balance, food consumption per capita)  
The effect of the negotiation after each round is measured according to the impact on the 
following five variables: 
• Farm income 
• Per capita food consumption  
• Government spending on agriculture 
• Agricultural trade balance 
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• Gross domestic product (GDP) 
Moreover, the Negociatrix-Policy-Game is used through a friendly, intuitive website interface 
allowing an input/output structure (http://resilience-foundation.nl/negociatrix_website).  
On the website the inputs or decisions made by the negotiators are introduced as new policy 
instrument package for each round. Several screens using both text and graphics supply 
information about: 
• the performance score as determined in a social welfare function for each round 
• country information 
• the policies used by all countries  
• market information 
3 Economics and policy  
3.1 Model description 
The game consists of a partial equilibrium multiple market-multiple country model. Markets 
are distinguished for three product categories:  a product representing cash crops (Tonco  
which is similar to cotton), a product representing processed crop (Casuc, which is a mix of 
coffee and sugar), and a product representing food crops ( Zor, which is equal torice). Besides 
these products eleven countries are distinguished, notably Benglapal (combination of 
Thailand and Viet-Nam), Esperantia (Brazil), Federatio (USA), Imperia (China), Ketanya 
(combination of Tanzania and Kenya), Insula (Mauritius), Mabu-Fabe (combination of Mali, 
Burkina Faso, Benin), Neosaxy (Autralia), Osterland (Japan), Pali (Haiti), Uniona (EU). In 
order to span the world market as a whole, a twelfth ‘country’ called the rest of the world 
(ROW) was added. The latter country takes care of the model closure: i.e. this the net 
production and demand for the three commodities exercised by the ROW is defined as the 
difference between world production less total supply or demand made up by the eleven pre-
specified  countries respectively. Each country is producer or/and consumer of at least two 
products and sometimes of the three. 
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3.1.1 Supply and demand 
Each country’s producer and consumer behaviour is represented by a supply and demand 
framework. Supplies and demands are a function of their own price and a number of shift 
variables (like income for consumer demand and technological for supply). As regards 
supply, this is also a function of the fertilizer price (variable input) and quasi-fixed inputs land 
and capital. An important characteristic of these supply and demand functions is their 
sensitivity to price changes (price elasticities), income changes (income elasticities) and 
dynamic shifters. In order to approach reality as much as possible,  the quantities supplied and 
demanded are based on a stylized presentation of the underlying countries’ supply and 
demand patterns for the early 2000s, whereas the price and income elasticities are best-
estimates based on the literature (see further details below). The game leader could use 
different elasticities if he would like so. The price responses are inelastic2, reflecting that in 
general farmers do not strongly change their supply and consumers do not strongly change 
their demand when prices change.  
Nevertheless, elasticities vary from one country to another. For instance, in a poor country 
like Ketanya, consumers more strongly increase their consumption of food when prices 
decreases than in Unionia or Federatio,, where the demand for food is highly satisfied.  
3.1.2 Shift variables and dynamics 
As already indicated, other factors than price also cause changes in demand or supply. In the 
model, growth in population and incomes shift the demand curve to the right over the rounds. 
This growth conforms to trends that are taken from other studies and usually described in the 
literature. Besides, there is an endogenous feedback effect from agricultural growth on 
income growth (this is explained below.) The supply curve is shifted to the right by technical 
change and changes in the capital stock of a sector. Technical change conforms to trends 
                                                
2 Because food/feed is a necessity for life, an increase in price does not generate a proportional decrease in the quantity 
demanded. This kind of response to price occur in general for most industrial goods but not for agricultural products for 
which demand varies little whether price is high or low, food/feed is price inelastic meaning that for any percentage decrease 
in price the quantity demanded increases by a smaller percentage. For example, a price elasticity of aggregate demand for 
agricultural products of 0.25 means that a 10 percent decrease in the index of agricultural prices would increase the quantity 
demanded all agricultural products by 2.5 percent. 
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taken from other studies. Capital stocks are diminished by depreciation, but increased by 
farmer investment if farm incomes exceed certain levels. Besides, governments can increase 
the capital stock of their agriculture by structural policies (this is explained below). 
In the agriculture of developed countries, the shift in supply tends to exceed that in demand 
(Schultz 1945). This is also reflected in the Negociatrix model. On the one hand, the shift in 
demand is slow because population 
growth has declined and income growth 
causes little increase in a demand that is 
already satisfied (low income elasticity). 
On the other hand, technical progress 
rapidly increases the productivity of 
labour, land and capital in the farm 
sector. The more rapid shift of the supply 
function lowers the price of farm 
products, the more because the elasticity 
of both functions is low. Thus in Figure 
1, the price P1 of the first round is 
reduced to P2 in the second round. As a result, farm incomes are squeezed. According to 
basic economic theory, this should trigger an outflow of production factors that moderates the 
shift in the supply function and allows a cost-price reducing reorganisation. However, in 
agriculture, this outflow is slowed because much labour is self-employed. For some 
economists this is an argument for income support: in a free market, farm incomes would be 
chronically depressed which would cause social problems and hamper farm progress 
(QUOTE). Others think that income support is unnecessary and would only exacerbate the 
problem, because it would further reduce the outflow of labour (Gardner, 1992). 
3.1.3 Agriculture in the macro-economy 
In the real economy, agricultural markets also interact with non-agricultural markets. General 
equilibrium models accounts with the interactions between all markets of an economy. 
However, the Negociatrix policy game is a partial equilibrium model that focuses on direct 
effects in the three commodity markets that are considered. Nevertheless, one important 
interaction between agriculture and the wider economy is included in the model.  If output of 
price 
volume 
D1 
S1 
P1 
V1 
Figure 1: shifts in demand and supply 
S2 
D2 
P2 
V2 
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agriculture grows faster (slower) than the national economy, the product of this difference and 
agriculture’s share in the national income is added to (subtracted from) the growth of the 
latter.  
3.1.4 Policy I: price wedges and price linkages 
The national markets for casuc, tonco and zor are connected through the world markets for 
these products. The equilibrium price (WMP = world market price) is the price where the 
world market demand equals the world market supply. National prices are based on this 
equilibrium price, taking 
into account a country’s 
specific policy mix (tariffs, 
subsidies, etc.). The price 
linkages are policy-
dependent, as is illustrated 
by Figure 2. If a country 
protects its domestic 
agriculture, depending on 
its net trade position, its 
internal price level will be 
equal to the world market 
price plus the import tariff 
(in case of a net importer) 
or the export subsidy (in case of a net exporter). The high internal price level Pd is the general 
price level prevailing in the economy, in particular for consumers. A country’s government 
could differentiate prices between consumers and producers by applying a deficiency 
payment. The producer price Ps is than equal to price Pd plus the deficiency payment 
(producer subsidy). A country can allow another country a preferential tariff, which holds 
within a certain quota (a so-called tariff rate quota TRQ). The foreign country exporting to the 
domestic country (see left part of Figure 2) that no longer receives price Pd less the import 
tariff for its product, but the higher price Pd less the TRQ rate (which is by definition smaller 
than the import tariff). 
import 
world 
market 
export 
D1 
Import 
tariff 
domestic 
market 
Figure 2: Price linkages and policy  instruments 
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3.1.5 Policy II: quantity constraints 
The policy instruments are not limited to price wedges, but also comprise quantity constraints. 
By the set-aside instrument 
the policy maker of a 
country can impose a 
constraint on the land 
quantity that is allowed to 
be used as an input for crop 
production (supply 
management). Moreover, as 
already touched upon 
before, a TRQ consists of a 
specific quota (import 
quantity constraint) and a 
special in-quota tariff (price wedge). A country can use the Tariff Rate Quote (TRQ) 
instrument to ensure a certain minimum market access in case the general import tariffs are 
prohibitive. Exporting countries can get TRQ privileges from several trade partners. This 
situation is further illustrated in Figure 3 where three TRQ quantities are allocated to the 
exporting country by three different (importing) trade partners. Along the horizontal axes the 
TRQ-quantities are given, whereas the vertical axes denotes the TRQ-rents the exporting 
country can earn, where the latter are ranked according to attractiveness. It is assumed that the 
exporting country will fill the TRQs according to attractiveness. Depending on the export-
capacity a country may fill one, some, or all TRQs. In this case, where the exporting country’s 
excess supply curve crosses the effective price line associated with TRQ Q2, this TRQ Q2 
quota is partly filled. The TRQ earnings for a country partly go to government and the 
remaining part goes to the farmers. The Negociatrix policy game, the game leader can fix the 
shares the government and farmers get. The money given to farmers, translates for them as an 
effective price increase, or product premium and thus will induce a supply response.  
3.1.6 Policy III: remaining instruments 
Finally, there are four additional policy instruments that should be mentioned. Firstly, the 
policy maker can make lump sum transfers to farmers (direct payments, which are decoupled 
Figure 3: TRQ privileges granted to an exporting country 
Pwm 
TRQ rate, 
Effective 
price 
TRQ 
rent 1 TRQ 
rent 2 
TRQ 
rent 3 
TRQ Q1 TRQ Q3 TRQ Q2 quantity 
Excess 
supply 
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from production). Secondly, the government can invest money into agriculture. This so-called 
structural policy includes investments in infrastructure, human capital, extensions services. In 
the model, the investments lead to an increase in the capital stock used as an input for 
agriculture. As such it increases the production capacity (implying a policy-induced shift of 
the supply curve to the right). Thirdly, the government of a donor country can decide to give 
food aid to a certain country. This food is bought by the government of the donor country and 
operates like an additional increase in domestic demand in this country. This food is 
subsequently donated to the recipient country. In the recipient country, it is assumed that part 
of the food aid will go to poor and hungry consumers (urgent relief aid which is assumed to 
have no substitution effects), whereas the other part will be added to the local market as 
additional supply. This operation impacts the domestic market by creating a downward 
pressure on food prices. The game leader can determine which fraction is going to the poor, 
and which fraction is going to compete on the local food market. Fourthly, the government 
can intervene in markets by stockpiling. The government then acts as an additional 
demanding party in the local market. The government can buy as well as sell intervention 
stocks. The food aid instrument is connected to the intervention instrument in that it operates 
similarly on the domestic market. The only difference is that there is no stockpiling in the 
case of food aid as the government donates the products bought to a recipient country. 
3.1.7 Policy aims 
The aim of the “Negociatrix” country governments is to maximise their national welfare. It is 
assumed that each country has four welfare goals: increase farm income; increase per capita 
food consumption; limit government spending on agriculture; and increase the agricultural 
trade balance (exports minus imports).  
Four indices reflect the extent to which these goals are attained: 
• farm income index: farm income per agricultural worker in the current round / 
farm income per agricultural worker in round 0 * 100; 
• per capita food consumption index: per capita food consumption in Calories in 
the current round / per capita food consumption in Calories in round 0 *100; 
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• index of limitation of government spending in agriculture: ([government 
spending on casuc, tonco and zor policies in round 0 + Agricultural GDP3 in 
round 0]/Agricultural GDP in round 0) / ([government spending on casuc, tonco 
and zor policies in current round + Agricultural GDP in current round)]/ 
Agricultural GDP in current round) * 100; 
• agricultural trade balance index: (value of domestic supply / value of domestic 
demand in current round) / (value of domestic supply / value of domestic 
demand in round 0) * 100; 
• GDP index: (GDPt – GDP0) / GDP0 . 100. 
The national welfare function in Negociatrix is a weighed addition of these four aims, with 
the weights reflecting the diverging policy priorities of the countries. Players can see the 
weights by clicking on ‘scores’ or on ‘country information’ entries in the Negociatrix main 
page on the website. 
In reality, establishing the welfare function of a country is not a simple question. The 
priorities of populations are difficult to assess and not always consistent. The priorities of 
governments may be clearer, but governments are not always democratically elected and 
when they are, their priorities do not always reflect those of their people. The welfare 
functions in Negiociatrix are seen as reflecting government priorities (See Annex A for a table 
providing the policy weights currently used). Ordinary Ketanyans, for example, might well 
disagree with the Ketanyan welfare function where reducing government spending on 
agriculture weights much more than increasing farm income or per capita food consumption. 
The idea, however, is that economising on agricultural spending is important for the political 
survival of the government, because it needs money to pay the salaries of the public sector 
employees that have been given to political supporters (Bates, 1982). 
Although establishing national welfare functions is a tricky issue, economists need such 
functions to examine the welfare effects of policies. The only welfare criterion that does not 
depend on such functions is the Pareto principle, which states that a policy is welfare 
increasing if some people gain while nobody looses. In practice, however, all policies have 
losers as well as winners. A policy where the winners gain more than the losers lose leads to a 
                                                
3 Agricultural GDP (gross domestic product) is approximated by the value of the production of the three crops (evaluated at world market 
prices). 
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potential Pareto improvement, because the former could compensate the latter and still retain 
some gain. However, a potential Pareto improvement only becomes a real improvement if this 
compensation is realised. Many economists think that a potential Pareto improvement means 
an improvement in economic efficiency irrespective of whether the losers are compensated, 
but should be interpreted as a misunderstanding. ‘Efficiency’ is an attribute of the relation 
between aims and means, but in the reasoning of these economists, what the aim is remains 
entirely unclear (Jongeneel & Koning, 1999). 
3.2 Structure of the Model 
Elasticities
Model 
Figure 4: Model structure 
Policy 
impuls 
input 
from 
TRQ Q3 TRQ Q2 
Groups of 
trainees 
representing 
country 
Base-year 
data
Policy impulse 
table 
Calculation table 
(including Solver 
program) 
Summary table 
Output to website 
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The basic model structure is provided in Figure 4. It consists of an Excel spreadsheet 
program, including various worksheets, which are structured as denoted in the figure. There is 
a worksheet which comprises all the base year data (prices, quantities, quasi fixed inputs 
capital and land, consumer income, state of technology, values of all the policy variables). 
Besides, there is a worksheet containing information on price and income responses (elasticity 
tables) of supply and demand, as well as on quasi-fixed inputs and technology. This 
worksheet also includes a big table providing elasticities and information from the base-year 
data that are used to calibrate the behavioural functions. In a subsequent sheet the reader can 
see all the calculations. This sheet firstly includes a table with the values that are submitted as 
pursued policies. These policy signals determine different price wedges, financial flows, and 
quantity constraints. In the next table of the calculation sheet, the policy information is 
combined with the earlier calibrated supply and demand for each commodity. Alongside with 
this worksheet a Solver routine is programmed, which exploits the policy information and the 
calibrated supplies and demands for all countries. The solver uses this information to find a 
market equilibrium, where world demand equals world supply. If this equilibrium condition is 
met the prices and quantities of the model are in equilibrium. All derived indicators like 
quantities supplied and demanded, farm income, food consumption per capita, budget 
expenditure, trade balance, etc. are calculated and are therefore endogenous. A summary 
table-worksheet comprises the output results ordered and structured in transparent tables.  
Moreover, the website has an interface that the game leader can use to upload the information 
regarding these summary sheets and project it in various tables on the website. 
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The structure of the website is as indicated in Figure 5. In the top row information is provided 
about the over-all scores of all countries by means of a thermometer-performance indicator. 
Not only the score of the current round, but also information about last round and the base 
line value are provided by the three cylinders respectively in red, pink and grey. 
At the left side of the website page there is a Menu-column, with the entries as indicated in 
Figure 5. The players can click and then obtain more detailed Tables or information. This will 
then show-up at the Selected Table block. The entries contain the following information: 
Country information: a short sheet with information on the history of the country, 
agricultural policy (including the weights of the social welfare function). 
Outcomes: This entry discloses all the information about the outcome all the negotiation 
rounds on policies, market effects, goal variables and government expenditure ordered in a 
number of transparent Tables. These tables are structured as follows: 
• Policies: Provides an overview of the policies pursued, not only for own country, but 
also provides similar information for all other countries. 
Figure 5: Web site structure 
Groups of 
students 
representing 
country 
governments 
Top-row: Information on social welfare scores  
(current round, previous round and base line value)
Selected Table(s) Menu- column 
• Country info 
• Outcomes 
• Economic 
Backgrounder 
• Manual 
Policies 
 
Market effects Trade details 
 
Goal variables 
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• Market effects: Provides the market data (supply, demand, net export, prices, etc.). If a 
country is a net exporter getting TRQ-privileges from one or more countries, then one 
can click on the net-export number after which a Figure pops-up which is similar to 
the Figure 3 presented before. 
• Goal variables: This sheet provides information about the scores on the goal variables 
in a rather detailed way (as much as possible decomposed over products). 
• Government expenditure: This sheet provides detailed information about the financial 
flows of public spending on agriculture. This is decomposed into several categories 
like direct payments, price support, food aid, etc.
Economic Backgrounder: Contains economic background information, which closely 
follows the structure of the game and includes a lot of informative graphs, which explain the 
working of all the policy instruments, within the context of the demand-supply framework. 
Manual: Provides information about the use of the website and also some more technical 
information about several model relationships. 
The tables presenting the outcomes of the play round, not only gives the numbers for the 
current round, but it also (below these numbers and in brackets) gives the percentage changes 
as compared to the previous round. Because the players see also the information of other 
countries they can try to make a full and integral assessment of what happened during the last 
round. Because, the outcomes are not only resulting from their own policies, but also affected 
by international conditions and in that way indirectly by the policies pursued by other players, 
players may find an interest in starting negotiations to understand how they could create value 
through trade overall and then share this value among countries (Fisher, Ury, Patton, 1982).  
Further below in the Menu column, the players can submit their country name and password. 
This allows them to display a policy submission sheet. This sheet shows all the policy 
instruments, their past values, a bound range within which players can freely choose their 
preferred instrument levels, and a column where the values for the next round should be 
inserted. After having filled the policy submission sheet, the policy options can be submitted 
and the values are automatically uploaded for the next round. If all countries have submitted 
their policy sheets, the game leader can temporary block the policy submission procedure (no 
longer allowing revisions or submissions) and run the model.  
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3.3 Calibration 
As already noted in a previous section, the backbone of the partial equilibrium model is the 
combination of the demand and supply functions. For these functions constant elasticity 
specifications are chosen. These functional forms have the advantage that they are asymptotic 
to the x- and y-axes and guarantee a smooth behaviour during simulations. The general form 
of the constant elasticity function is  
zp
iiii ZPcQ εε ..=
        (1) 
where Qi stands for the dependent quantity variable (demand or supply), ci represents a 
constant, Pi represents the relevant own price and Zi stands for a shift variable.  The values of 
the quantity, price and z-variables used for the calibration are obtained from the base year 
data (see Annex B for an overview of the values currently used). Rather than one, there can be 
a number of Z variables (examples are income, technology, fertilizer price, land, and capital).  
The elasticities, both for the price and z-variables are directly known from the elasticity tables 
(see discussion in previous paragraph about calibration worksheet). The elasticities are best 
estimates based on the literature, complemented with best estimates from the authors, where 
no information could be found (see Annex C for an overview of these estimates). Regarding 
the literature, much use has been made of the SWOPSIM database (Sullivan et al, 1992). The 
values of the quantity, price and z-variables used for the calibration are obtained from the 
base year data. Included in the base year data are also the base year’s policy variables (price 
wedges and quantity constraints).  
The base year data have a stylized character presenting the situation for the early 2000s. Price 
and quantity data were mainly based on FAO statistics. A three year weighted average around 
year 2000 was first constructed, and then rounded numbers close to these three year weighted 
averages were chosen. For casuc, data for coffee (both Arabica and Robusta) and sugar (both 
beet and sugar cane) have been taken and aggregated. For tonco, lint cotton is used instead of 
cottonseed and a mean conversion coefficient between lint and cottonseed of 0,32 (kg lint 
cotton/ kg cottonseed). Data is derived from FAO Stat in the same way as casuc. For zor, in 
the model rice paddy equivalent is used. Data was derived from FAO Stat in the same way as 
tonco. No distinction has been made between indica and japonica rice varieties. The world 
market price is set to be equal to market price of the mot competitive producer. For zor for 
example, the world market price was set equal to the Brazilian price. 
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Given the information discussed above, the only unknown coefficient is the constant ci, which 
now however can easily be determined by. 
zp
ii
i
i ZP
Q
c
εε
.
=
       (2) 
As a check on the calibration procedure, the game is solved for its base-year values of the 
policy instruments and taking into account all the calibrated behavioural relationships, the 
price linkage relationships, and the market equilibrium conditions. The model then should 
reproduce base-year quantities and prices. 
4 Implications of the first application and experiences for 
conditions of use 
As previously stated, the purpose of the Negociatrix simulation as well as the Negociatrix 
policy game is to simulate a multilateral negotiation similar to the one held in the WTO, to 
develop the capacities of negotiators or policy makers involved in International Multilateral 
Negotiations. The simulation is presented like a formal conference whereas the policy game 
takes the form of an on going process of informal negotiation. The focus of each tool is 
different but they complement each other.  
The Negociatrix simulation created in 2004 has been used in several occasions by FAO as 
well as other institutions like IRENE or InWEnt4. The simulation allows addressing the 
following issues: 
- Managing the process of international complex negotiations  
- Dealing with power asymmetry 
- Building and using coalitions 
- Overcoming deadlocks and dealing with special processes 
- Managing information and communication channel 
                                                
4
 Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung, Strengthening capacities and international development.
  
© 2007 FAO- Wageningen University. All rigths reserved.  21
The Negociatrix policy game was first used in Wageningen University for a limited group of 
staff members and students. Moreover, its twin, the Agripol-policy game, was used for 
students following the curriculum of agricultural economics. This resulted in a number of 
useful experiences. Whereas the Agripol game consists of seven countries, Negociatrix 
features eleven countries. For the purpose of testing the latter, it was decided to simplify the 
Negociatrix environment by reducing the number of countries to five instead of eleven.  Such 
an option for the dry run, made the model less complex and therefore easier to understand5. 
The feed back provided by the staff members and students and the observations made by the 
trainers allowed to draw the following findings: 
- the policy game creates a high degree of involvement. Participants were 
enthusiastic, liked this way of learning and demonstrated creative behaviour; 
- game use encourages the participants, who acted in small groups representing 
a country, to learn from each other in a highly interactive way; 
- the virtual environment does not prevent the participant from understanding 
how complex the linkages between policy making and the real negotiations can 
be. this refers to the difficulty of pursuing multiple objectives that are 
sometimes conflicting and managing a policy process and taking into 
consideration the interdependencies among countries and the resulting 
uncertainty in assessing the overall impacts of policies;  
- the economic and political importance of countries vary. Small players 
(countries) have limited means to influence the world market equilibrium; large 
players have market power. It generally costs time (several plays) for the 
participants ‘to discover’ this and therefore adapt their strategy accordingly6; 
- even when the focus of the exercise is on content with great emphasis on few 
variables to measure the outcome, process and relationship matter and 
significantly influence the result.  
                                                
5
 Based on this experience, it was decided to include a country aggregation module in the software which allows 
the game leader to limit the number of countries to numbers smaller than 11 and larger or equal to two. 
6
 As such the Negociatrix policy simulation game better reflects most of the power distributions of the real world 
than the Negociatrix simulation game. In the latter the countries and participant groups are acting more on an 
equal footing. 
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- strategy as well as communication have to be consistent the more so when the 
possibilities of interacting with others parties are limited to exchanges of 
numbers and figures; 
Moreover, the experience has shown that it is important to link up the use of the policy game 
to a training seminar on negotiation skills. It appears that players that have been exposed to 
the basics of negotiation tend to appreciate the connections between strategy and outcome 
more easily. In the context of the policy game, it is of paramount importance to capture 
rapidly the linkages between changes in national policy measures and the impact of these 
changes at global level through the adjustments on markets and the new equilibrium.  
In addition, by linking training on negotiation skills with this tool on policy analysis 
capacities it is likely that players will adopt a cooperative approach more rapidly than in cases 
trainees are left to their intuitive approach to negotiation. Experiences with the Agripol game, 
where students were missing a training on negotiation skills confirm this. In about 80% of the 
cases then participants directly or after a few plays adopted non-cooperative behaviour, which 
in the end negatively affected the performance of all (e.g. the prisoners dilemma or social 
dilemma game). More remarkably, although participants/countries were preparing their policy 
submissions in one single classroom and could easily interact, this option was scarcely used. 
As already mentioned earlier, it is critical for the Negociatrix policy game that players decide 
to interact with each other at some stage in order to identify creative options that can satisfy 
their interests. It is therefore useful that players know how to identify interests and options 
that could satisfy the highest possible number of players. The earlier this interaction 
materializes the better the outcome of the game in terms of overall value creation as well as 
value sharing.  
The ideal scenario for full fledge training seminars consists in two modules. The first module 
should focus on basic tools and concepts on negotiation. It can be designed for two to three 
days. The second module then consists in running first the Negociatrix simulation and then 
the Negociatrix policy game. The simulation ideally requires two days and the policy game 
one day. It means that overall one week is required to address the objectives of the Project on 
Negotiation at FAO for acquisition of both negotiation skills and policy analysis capacities.  
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Another finding points to the need of good understanding of trade, sufficient analytical 
capacities and basic knowledge about policy instruments. It is actually important that few 
prerequisites along these lines be checked before running the policy game in order for the 
players to be able to come up with new policy mix proposals for each round. 
More generally, there is a need for embedding the Negociatrix policy game in a training or 
education programme that also emphasizes trade economics on the one hand and enabling 
skills on the other hand. It means that it is advisable to use this tool to focus on strengthening 
capacities in policy analysis in the framework of a wider curriculum touching upon 
negotiation skills and communication as well. From an educational point of view, we 
experienced that it pays to use as much as possible a general interpretation framework. For 
this, the demand and supply framework (see also Figures in section 3) was chosen. As much 
as possible it was tried to rephrase the informative and analytical questions asked during the 
trainings by the participants in terms of this backbone-framework. Extensively using one such 
framework provides the participants with a basic way of thinking with ‘universal’ 
applicability. Moreover, it helps them to create linkages between various problem-issues and 
policy instruments. 
Lastly regarding the complexity of the game (several countries, several policy instruments 
which may be used in a mixed way to achieve multiple goals), can initially be rather 
confusing to participants. Therefore, it helps if the trainers can provide a heuristic (replicable 
method or approach for directing one's attention in learning, discovery, or problem-solving) to 
understand the impact of the policies pursued by various players on the world and local 
market equilibriums (interpreting policy simulation results). Moreover, in order to facilitate a 
structured way of thinking, it is useful to fill-in sheets with in rows the policy instruments and 
in columns the policy objectives (including their weights). This type of table helps the 
participants better understand the relationships between goal and instruments as well as the 
usefulness of developing policy packages in reference to. The optimal policy theory 
developed by Tinbergen in 1963.  
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5 Concluding remarks 
This communication describes the main characteristics of the Negociatrix policy game, its 
relation to the Negociatrix simulation, as well as a number of first experiences. It appears that 
several of the advantages of using games in economics trainings coming from the literature 
are reflected in our first experiences. In general they emphasize the positive contribution 
games make as compared to more traditional training methods. Whereas complexity and 
uncertainty characterize the real world, it also appears that a relatively simple game as the 
Negociatrix policy game (consisting of three markets with no more than ten policy 
instruments per market, and social welfare being an aggregate of no more than five variables) 
is perceived by trainees as tool reflecting a similar complexity. This not only creates ‘realism’ 
but at the same time underscores the need to take care of the learning curve and the 
educational objectives of the game. The extent to which the Negociatrix policy game is 
consistently included in an overall training programme is of paramount importance.  
Moreover, an active role of the trainer to provide information about content in a convenient 
way by making use of simplified frameworks, heuristics, instrument-goal sheets, etc. is 
essential. FAO and the University of Wageningen are already committed to providing this 
type of comprehensive training. in the case of FAO it is for example through series of 
workshops and through Easypol which is on-line, interactive multilingual repository of 
downloadable resource materials for capacity development in policy making 
(www.fao.org/easypol). In the case of the University of Wageningen, this is achieved through 
more traditional medium and long term curricula for students and trainees coming from both 
developed and developing countries. 
Bargaining and negotiation skills on agricultural policy issues cannot be dealt with in an 
isolated way. Exploring and understanding economic mechanisms, the functioning of policy 
instruments either alone or in packages will improve the value added of the acquired skills. 
First experiences tend to show that as such the Negociatrix policy game can contribute to an 
improved understanding of the actual WTO negotiations on agriculture both from the 
negotiation and analytical perspectives.  
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Annex A  Table country-specific policy weights matrix 
weigths BenglapalEsperantiaFederatio Imperia Insula KetanyaMabu-FabeNeosaxy Pali Osterland Uniona
Farm income 0.17 0.21 0.23 0.06 0.00 0.16 0.30 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.25
Per capita food consumption 0.22 0.28 0.21 0.12 0.23 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.22 0.08 0.25
Limiting government spending 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.27 0.04 0.14 0.01 0.11 0.24 0.10 0.09
Agricultural trade balance 0.32 0.35 0.41 0.51 0.60 0.53 0.38 0.34 0.35 0.57 0.13
GDP 0.17 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.13 0.11 0.21 0.27 0.05 0.21 0.29
Total 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
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Annex B  Base year data used in Negociatrix 
Product Variable BenglapalEsperantiaFederatio Imperia Insula Ketanya Mabu-FabeNeosaxy Pali OsterlandUniona ROW WORLD
Casuc AreaHarvested (1000 Ha) 1,757 7,471 1,411 1,862 192 529 11 417 72 91 2,171 20,779 36,764
Casuc CapitalStock(bil $) 27,637 15,491 15,331 1,742 5,780 908 4 48 1,253 814 3,722 10,014 36,308
Casuc Demand ( 1000 Ton) 4,057 66,930 37,020 15,054 12 2,339 93 1,716 857 12,818 78,994 126,856 346,746
Casuc Exports(1000 Ton) 19,127 48,789 3,689 419 571 2,045 7 3,510 60 144 69,598 35,402 0
Casuc Ferteliser Consumption (1000 ton) 1,251 240 4,326 2,169 4 0 1 3 1 440 227 1,884 10,545
Casuc Imports(1000Ton) 0 0 32,984 1,833 33 66 40 1,318 118 12,155 125,491 9,324 0
Casuc Price(Cons-$/ton) 1,028 733 2,974 2,801 4,995 1,527 3,744 1,684 1,212 6,824 1,595 733 733
Casuc Price(Prod-$/ton) 1,028 733 2,974 2,801 4,995 1,527 3,744 1,684 1,212 6,824 1,595 733 733
Casuc Production(1000 Ton) 20,294 64,724 6,123 11,005 620 2,577 86 3,226 776 511 21,688 133,808 265,438
Casuc StockChange(1000 Ton) -90 -14,805 -216 -1,766 70 -1,317 26 -683 -5 22 -1,413 23,416 3,239
Casuc Stocks(1000Ton) 2,799 36,191 1,386 869 0 423 0 0 19 318 0 42,542 84,547
Tonco AreaHarvested (1000 Ha) 45 768 5,029 4,184 0 450 1,275 224 4 0 475 19,337 31,790
Tonco CapitalStock(bil $) 81 189 56,993 3,273 0 65 156 26 3 0 814 19,996 32,299
Tonco Demand ( 1000 Ton) 515 671 1,605 5,016 9 64 43 173 1 275 664 7,791 16,827
Tonco Exports(1000 Ton) 32 110 2,281 155 0 3 532 446 0 0 296 0 0
Tonco Ferteliser Consumption (1000 ton) 10 22 88 299 0 21 6 1 0 0 42 675 1,165
Tonco Imports(1000Ton) 530 68 96 514 9 1 0 0 0 275 589 1,773 0
Tonco Price(Cons-$/ton) 495 239 250 1,599 495 133 604 466 112 1,112 545 245 245
Tonco Price(Prod-$/ton) 495 239 250 1,599 0 133 604 466 112 1,112 545 245 245
Tonco Production(1000 Ton) 18 713 3,800 4,650 0 66 575 619 0 0 371 6,017 16,827
Tonco StockChange(1000 Ton) 0 0 -54 267 0 0 18 26 0 0 64 544 869
Tonco Stocks(1000Ton) 5 358 2,104 1,672 0 9 172 519 0 0 359 0 9,751
Zor AreaHarvested (1000 Ha) 8,802 3,146 9,988 28,509 0 337 437 150 52 1,688 398 94,186 147,693
Zor CapitalStock(bil $) 17,693 775 113,196 22,300 0 50 33 17 48 15,140 682 46,588 90,214
Zor Demand ( 1000 Ton) 47,838 10,678 24,332 176,085 0 2,188 789 1,651 104 11,049 2,357 283,572 560,642
Zor Exports(1000 Ton) 3 0 1,586 13 0 5 3 134 0 0 2 0 0
Zor Ferteliser Consumption (1000 ton) 1,196 92 4,007 2,037 0 0 1 1 0 418 35 1,644 9,430
Zor Imports(1000Ton) 0 221 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 42 1,481 0
Zor Price(Cons-$/ton) 168 92 85 141 422 219 217 149 234 1,861 290 85 85
Zor Price(Prod-$/ton) 168 92 85 141 0 219 217 149 234 1,861 290 85 85
Zor Production(1000 Ton) 47,841 10,457 25,918 176,097 0 2,193 790 1,785 104 11,049 2,316 282,091 560,642
Zor StockChange(1000 Ton) -3,825 0 139 245 0 -1,503 75 -494 0 62 290 22,357 17,347
Zor Stocks(1000Ton) 885 728 1,635 10,806 0 27 11 103 4 670 191 13,575 34,639
General GDP growth % 2.1% 1.3% 1.1% 3.5% 1.5% 1.8% 4.0% 3.3% 0.5% -0.1% 2.4% 1.6% 1.6%
General GDP US $ (billion) 182 506 10,961 1,641 5 25 12 527 3 4,237 11,273 7,378 36,751
General GDP (1000$)/ Capita 1 3 38 1 4 0 0 28 0 33 25 2 6
General Pop in Agr (1000) 58,917 28,281 27,248 853,771 137 52,896 23,985 877 4,986 4,920 27,331 1,490,107 2,573,456
General Pop in Agr (change) -0.6% -2.1% 1.3% -0.2% -2.3% 0.0% 2.2% -0.7% 0.4% -4.5% -3.0% 0.5% 0.2%
General Total population (1000) 139,062 171,797 285,003 1,282,473 1,185 65,386 30,031 19,153 8,005 127,034 452,297 3,489,160 6,070,586
General Population growth 1.2% 1.2% 2.0% 0.7% 0.9% 1.2% 3.3% 0.9% 1.4% 0.1% 0.1% 1.6% 1.3%
General Price fertiliser $/kg 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.2 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
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Annex C Elasticity information used in Negociatrix 
Elasticities Benglapal Esperantia Federatio Imperia Insula Ketanya Mabu-Fabe Neosaxy Pali Osterland Uniona WORLD ROW
Casuc supply Price 0.45 0.60 0.50 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.50 0.30 0.45 0.15 0.37 0.37
Casuc supply Price fertilizer -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.05 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.05 -0.05 -0.10 -0.10
Casuc supply capital 1.20 0.80 0.80 0.80 1.20 1.20 1.20 0.80 1.20 0.80 0.80 1.20 1.20
Casuc supply land 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
Tonco Supply Price 0.20 0.70 0.74 0.10 0.40 0.40 0.15 0.50 0.49 0.23 0.14 0.15 0.15
Tonco Supply Price fertilizer -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.05 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.05 -0.05 -0.10 -0.10
Tonco Supply capital 1.20 0.80 0.80 0.80 1.20 1.20 1.20 0.80 1.20 0.80 0.80 1.20 1.20
Tonco Supply land 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
Zor Supply Price 0.50 0.40 0.40 0.15 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.60 0.58 0.50 0.35 0.22 0.22
Zor Supply Price fertilizer -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.05 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.05 -0.05 -0.10 -0.10
Zor Supply capital 1.20 0.80 0.80 0.80 1.20 1.20 1.20 0.80 1.20 0.80 0.80 1.20 1.20
Zor Supply land 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
Cauc demand price -0.60 -0.60 -0.24 -0.20 -0.30 -0.27 -0.27 -0.25 -0.30 -0.54 -0.50 -0.20 -0.20
Cauc demand income 0.67 0.26 0.04 0.70 0.20 0.28 0.62 0.18 0.43 0.14 0.12 0.18 0.18
Cauc demand population 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Tonco demand price -0.60 -0.60 -0.20 -0.20 -0.47 -0.47 -0.47 -0.20 -0.20 -0.30 -0.50 -0.13 -0.13
Tonco demand income 1.18 0.45 0.40 1.10 0.50 0.83 1.10 0.23 0.68 0.36 0.20 0.13 0.13
Tonco demand population 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Zor demand price cereals -0.30 -0.45 -0.25 -0.20 -0.27 -0.30 -0.30 -0.45 -0.65 -0.25 -0.50 -0.40 -0.40
Zor demand income 0.65 0.27 0.14 0.44 0.20 0.56 0.72 0.24 0.36 0.00 0.21 0.35 0.35
Zor demand population 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
